Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Propositions', 'Sense and Sensibilia' and 'The Theory of Objects'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic

8250	So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

9455	Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions

9454	The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness

21598

Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

8719	There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought

8971	There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong]

8718	Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects

7756	Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]

15781

The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

9453	Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]

9452	Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense

9451	Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]