15 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
13750 | Analysis aims at the structure of facts, which are needed to give a rationale to analysis [Urmson, by Schaffer,J] |
9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |