Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Propositions', 'Scepticism' and 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed)'

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher]
Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]
Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha]
Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
We only see points in motion, and thereby infer movement [Rescher]