18 ideas
| 13941 | Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R] |
| 13942 | Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R] |
| 9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
| 9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
| 16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
| 16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
| 13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R] |
| 16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
| 13950 | People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R] |
| 13948 | For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R] |
| 13944 | We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R] |
| 13947 | 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R] |
| 9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
| 9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
| 9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |
| 13943 | We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R] |
| 13946 | To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R] |
| 13951 | Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R] |