Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Propositions', 'Against the Ethicists (one book)' and 'The Identity of Indiscernibles'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


13 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus]