14 ideas
| 9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
| 9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
| 10009 | Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin] |
| 16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
| 16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
| 16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
| 16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
| 16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
| 16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
| 16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
| 16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
| 9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
| 9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
| 9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |