11 ideas
| 9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
| 9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
| 10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
| 18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
| 10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |
| 9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
| 9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
| 18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
| 9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |
| 18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
| 18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |