57 ideas
| 21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
| 21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
| 21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
| 21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
| 21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
| 21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
| 21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
| 21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
| 21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
| 18758 | Validity is provable, but invalidity isn't, because the model is infinite [Church, by McGee] |
| 21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
| 3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
| 3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
| 21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
| 22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
| 21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
| 21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
| 3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
| 3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
| 3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
| 3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
| 21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
| 3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
| 5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
| 5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
| 1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
| 6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
| 3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
| 3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
| 3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
| 3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
| 3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
| 3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
| 3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
| 3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
| 3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
| 3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
| 3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
| 21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
| 21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
| 3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
| 3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
| 21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
| 3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
| 21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
| 3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
| 3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
| 6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
| 5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
| 3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
| 21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |
| 3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
| 3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
| 3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
| 3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
| 3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |