Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Principles of Human Knowledge', 'On Relations of Universals and Particulars' and 'The Vocation of Man'

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59 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley]
When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley]
The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte]
There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte]
Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley]
I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte]
The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley]