Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Second-Order Logic', 'Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit' and 'Seven Quodlibets'

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20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
14249 Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley]
10830 Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
10829 A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10832 '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10834 Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
13841 Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10833 Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
18529 Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
16779 Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
16757 Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9102 If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
9114 There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6237 Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6234 If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6233 A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
6236 People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
6235 Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
6232 Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
5642 For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
9115 To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham]