Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root'' and 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22153 Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
4187 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
19485 Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
19486 We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4192 All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
4190 All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
4191 What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
21368 The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
19487 Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
4189 Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer]