14 ideas
| 11193 | Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna] |
| 14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
| 14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
| 10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
| 10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
| 10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
| 14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
| 10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
| 13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
| 10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
| 11209 | The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna] |
| 11204 | The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna] |
| 14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
| 15036 | An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio] |