Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'Sameness and Substance' and 'Maxims and Reflections'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
16512 Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17529 Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
17530 The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
16523 Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
16524 Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
16526 Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16492 Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
16493 Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
16496 Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
16495 The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
16501 In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
16506 Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
16509 Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
16514 Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
16510 Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16503 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
16499 A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
16515 A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
16517 Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
16498 Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
16497 Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
16502 Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16521 A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
16505 By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
16494 We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16522 It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
7544 Many people imagine that to experience is to understand [Goethe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
7541 Man never understands how anthropomorphic he is [Goethe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
16525 Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
7543 We gain self-knowledge through action, not thought - especially when doing our duty [Goethe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
16518 We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
16511 A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
7540 Beauty is a manifestation of secret natural laws [Goethe]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
7538 The happiest people link the beginning and end of life [Goethe]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
7542 The best form of government teaches us to govern ourselves [Goethe]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
7539 To get duties from people without rights, you must pay them well [Goethe]