Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'Reality without Reference' and 'The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap'

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
18270 Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
18263 The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
18272 Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18266 Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6387 A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
6391 A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
6388 Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson]
6390 With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
6389 To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
18279 Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa]