Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82' and 'Frege philosophy of mathematics'

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78 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche]
The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett]
Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett]
It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett]
'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett]
Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett]
An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait]
We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche]
The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche]
Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche]
Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche]
The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche]