Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'Dispositions and Powers' and 'The Idea of Justice'

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49 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG]
Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen]
Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 13. Green Politics
Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen]
Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen]
All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen]
Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen]
Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen]
We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen]
If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]