20 ideas
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
20041 | Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe] |