Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws)' and 'Substance'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality [Robb]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts [Robb]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]