16 ideas
14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan] |
10467 | Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John] |
10464 | A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John] |
10465 | Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John] |
5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
10466 | Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John] |
5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |
5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan] |
5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan] |