Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The iterative conception of Set', 'Proper Names' and 'Phenomenalism'

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8 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII

18192

Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

7746	We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]

7747	How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]

7748	'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]

7749	Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]

7750	Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

2614	Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

2615	The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]