Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'The Morality of Happiness' and 'Contextualism Defended (and reply)'

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24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19558 Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
19561 We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
19563 The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
19560 Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19559 Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
3546 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
3547 Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
3543 Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
3541 Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3550 Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3551 Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
3552 If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3542 We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas]