Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge' and 'Causal Relations'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
8349 The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
8348 If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
9329 Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
8347 Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
9330 Generalization seems to be more fundamental to minds than spotting similarities [Lehrer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
9328 All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
10371 Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8403 Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8346 Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
4778 A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]