Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'Intuitionism and Formalism' and 'Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions'

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29 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
21544 It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
12452 Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
21539 Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
12451 Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
12454 Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
12453 Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21538 If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21534 The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
21540 Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
21536 When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
21535 Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
21533 Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
21537 I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
21532 Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
21542 Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
21541 The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10117 Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
21543 If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]