Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'To be is to be the value of a variable..', 'works' and 'Abstraction Reconsidered'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
10735 Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people
7082 Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
10732 If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
10731 For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
10733 The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach]
10734 Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22155 We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter]