Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Must We Believe in Set Theory?', 'Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge'' and 'The Making of a Philosopher'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10482 The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10492 A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
10485 Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10484 The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
10491 Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
10483 Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10490 Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10488 It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10487 I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10489 We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
4691 If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5673 If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5670 Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5671 Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam]
5672 Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam]
5675 Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5674 We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
4690 If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn]