18 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
18779 | 'The' is a quantifier, like 'every' and 'a', and does not result in denotation [Montague] |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |