Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Review of Frege's 'Grundlagen'', 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' and 'Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
19306 It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
19304 The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
19307 If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
19309 Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
19303 Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8877 We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9992 The 'extension of a concept' in general may be quantitatively completely indeterminate [Cantor]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
8884 The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
19305 The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
19310 High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
8878 It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19308 We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
8880 In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8881 Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8882 Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
8883 Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
8885 Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8876 Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8879 Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]