91 ideas
15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
15901 | Trying to represent curves, we study arbitrary functions, leading to the ordinals, which produces set theory [Cantor, by Lavine] |
18098 | Cantor proved that all sets have more subsets than they have members [Cantor, by Bostock] |
13444 | Cantor's Theorem: for any set x, its power set P(x) has more members than x [Cantor, by Hart,WD] |
15505 | If a set is 'a many thought of as one', beginners should protest against singleton sets [Cantor, by Lewis] |
10701 | Cantor showed that supposed contradictions in infinity were just a lack of clarity [Cantor, by Potter] |
10865 | The continuum is the powerset of the integers, which moves up a level [Cantor, by Clegg] |
13016 | The Axiom of Union dates from 1899, and seems fairly obvious [Cantor, by Maddy] |
14199 | Cantor's sets were just collections, but Dedekind's were containers [Cantor, by Oliver/Smiley] |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
10082 | There are infinite sets that are not enumerable [Cantor, by Smith,P] |
13483 | Cantor's Paradox: the power set of the universe must be bigger than the universe, yet a subset of it [Cantor, by Hart,WD] |
8710 | The powerset of all the cardinal numbers is required to be greater than itself [Cantor, by Friend] |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
15910 | Cantor named the third realm between the finite and the Absolute the 'transfinite' [Cantor, by Lavine] |
15905 | Cantor proved the points on a plane are in one-to-one correspondence to the points on a line [Cantor, by Lavine] |
9983 | Cantor took the ordinal numbers to be primary [Cantor, by Tait] |
17798 | Cantor presented the totality of natural numbers as finite, not infinite [Cantor, by Mayberry] |
9971 | Cantor introduced the distinction between cardinals and ordinals [Cantor, by Tait] |
9892 | Cantor showed that ordinals are more basic than cardinals [Cantor, by Dummett] |
14136 | A cardinal is an abstraction, from the nature of a set's elements, and from their order [Cantor] |
15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
11015 | Cantor's diagonal argument proved you can't list all decimal numbers between 0 and 1 [Cantor, by Read] |
15906 | Cantor tried to prove points on a line matched naturals or reals - but nothing in between [Cantor, by Lavine] |
15903 | A real is associated with an infinite set of infinite Cauchy sequences of rationals [Cantor, by Lavine] |
18251 | Irrational numbers are the limits of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers [Cantor, by Lavine] |
15902 | Irrationals and the Dedekind Cut implied infinite classes, but they seemed to have logical difficulties [Cantor, by Lavine] |
15908 | It was Cantor's diagonal argument which revealed infinities greater than that of the real numbers [Cantor, by Lavine] |
13464 | Cantor proposes that there won't be a potential infinity if there is no actual infinity [Cantor, by Hart,WD] |
10112 | The naturals won't map onto the reals, so there are different sizes of infinity [Cantor, by George/Velleman] |
17889 | CH: An infinite set of reals corresponds 1-1 either to the naturals or to the reals [Cantor, by Koellner] |
10883 | Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis says there is a gap between the natural and the real numbers [Cantor, by Horsten] |
8733 | The Continuum Hypothesis says there are no sets between the natural numbers and reals [Cantor, by Shapiro] |
13528 | Continuum Hypothesis: there are no sets between N and P(N) [Cantor, by Wolf,RS] |
9555 | Continuum Hypothesis: no cardinal greater than aleph-null but less than cardinality of the continuum [Cantor, by Chihara] |
13447 | Cantor: there is no size between naturals and reals, or between a set and its power set [Cantor, by Hart,WD] |
15893 | Cantor's theory concerns collections which can be counted, using the ordinals [Cantor, by Lavine] |
18174 | Cantor extended ordinals into the transfinite, and they can thus measure infinite cardinalities [Cantor, by Maddy] |
18173 | Cardinality strictly concerns one-one correspondence, to test infinite sameness of size [Cantor, by Maddy] |
10232 | Property extensions outstrip objects, so shortage of objects caused the Caesar problem [Cantor, by Shapiro] |
18176 | Pure mathematics is pure set theory [Cantor] |
15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
8631 | Cantor says that maths originates only by abstraction from objects [Cantor, by Frege] |
15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
8715 | Infinities expand the bounds of the conceivable; we explore concepts to explore conceivability [Cantor, by Friend] |
13454 | Cantor says (vaguely) that we abstract numbers from equal sized sets [Hart,WD on Cantor] |
15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
22258 | Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel] |
22259 | Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel] |
22260 | Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel] |
10863 | Cantor proved that three dimensions have the same number of points as one dimension [Cantor, by Clegg] |
13465 | Only God is absolutely infinite [Cantor, by Hart,WD] |