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All the ideas for 'Review of Frege's 'Grundlagen'', 'Reflections on Value' and 'Essential Attribution'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23881 All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
23885 Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
23886 Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
23884 Truth is a value of thought [Weil]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9992 The 'extension of a concept' in general may be quantitatively completely indeterminate [Cantor]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11187 In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
23882 Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23883 Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]