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All the ideas for 'works', 'Truth and Ontology' and 'Recent Aesthetics in England and America'

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70 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Trying to represent curves, we study arbitrary functions, leading to the ordinals, which produces set theory [Cantor, by Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
Cantor's Theorem: for any set x, its power set P(x) has more members than x [Cantor, by Hart,WD]
Cantor proved that all sets have more subsets than they have members [Cantor, by Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
If a set is 'a many thought of as one', beginners should protest against singleton sets [Cantor, by Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
The continuum is the powerset of the integers, which moves up a level [Cantor, by Clegg]
Cantor showed that supposed contradictions in infinity were just a lack of clarity [Cantor, by Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
The Axiom of Union dates from 1899, and seems fairly obvious [Cantor, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / b. Combinatorial sets
Cantor's sets were just collections, but Dedekind's were containers [Cantor, by Oliver/Smiley]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
There are infinite sets that are not enumerable [Cantor, by Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
Cantor's Paradox: the power set of the universe must be bigger than the universe, yet a subset of it [Cantor, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
The powerset of all the cardinal numbers is required to be greater than itself [Cantor, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Cantor named the third realm between the finite and the Absolute the 'transfinite' [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Cantor proved the points on a plane are in one-to-one correspondence to the points on a line [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Cantor took the ordinal numbers to be primary [Cantor, by Tait]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Cantor presented the totality of natural numbers as finite, not infinite [Cantor, by Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Cantor introduced the distinction between cardinals and ordinals [Cantor, by Tait]
Cantor showed that ordinals are more basic than cardinals [Cantor, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
A cardinal is an abstraction, from the nature of a set's elements, and from their order [Cantor]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Cantor tried to prove points on a line matched naturals or reals - but nothing in between [Cantor, by Lavine]
Cantor's diagonal argument proved you can't list all decimal numbers between 0 and 1 [Cantor, by Read]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
A real is associated with an infinite set of infinite Cauchy sequences of rationals [Cantor, by Lavine]
Irrational numbers are the limits of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Irrationals and the Dedekind Cut implied infinite classes, but they seemed to have logical difficulties [Cantor, by Lavine]
It was Cantor's diagonal argument which revealed infinities greater than that of the real numbers [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Cantor proposes that there won't be a potential infinity if there is no actual infinity [Cantor, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
The naturals won't map onto the reals, so there are different sizes of infinity [Cantor, by George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
CH: An infinite set of reals corresponds 1-1 either to the naturals or to the reals [Cantor, by Koellner]
The Continuum Hypothesis says there are no sets between the natural numbers and reals [Cantor, by Shapiro]
Cantor: there is no size between naturals and reals, or between a set and its power set [Cantor, by Hart,WD]
Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis says there is a gap between the natural and the real numbers [Cantor, by Horsten]
Continuum Hypothesis: there are no sets between N and P(N) [Cantor, by Wolf,RS]
Continuum Hypothesis: no cardinal greater than aleph-null but less than cardinality of the continuum [Cantor, by Chihara]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Cantor's theory concerns collections which can be counted, using the ordinals [Cantor, by Lavine]
Cantor extended ordinals into the transfinite, and they can thus measure infinite cardinalities [Cantor, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
Cardinality strictly concerns one-one correspondence, to test infinite sameness of size [Cantor, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Property extensions outstrip objects, so shortage of objects caused the Caesar problem [Cantor, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Pure mathematics is pure set theory [Cantor]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Cantor says that maths originates only by abstraction from objects [Cantor, by Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Infinities expand the bounds of the conceivable; we explore concepts to explore conceivability [Cantor, by Friend]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Cantor says (vaguely) that we abstract numbers from equal sized sets [Hart,WD on Cantor]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Cantor proved that three dimensions have the same number of points as one dimension [Cantor, by Clegg]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Only God is absolutely infinite [Cantor, by Hart,WD]