18 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
17831 | Cantor gives informal versions of ZF axioms as ways of getting from one set to another [Cantor, by Lake] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
16978 | If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko] |
16975 | Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
16976 | Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko] |
16977 | If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko] |