Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Life of Reason', 'Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
He who is ignorant of the history of philosophy is doomed to repeat it [Santayana, by MacIntyre]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K]
My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]