Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind', 'Twilight of the Idols' and 'Letters'

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110 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars [Rey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic [Rey]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds [Rey]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge [Rey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
Animal learning is separate from their behaviour [Rey]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned [Rey]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentional explanations are always circular [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia [Rey]
Why qualia, and why this particular quale? [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey]
Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey]
Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will' [Rey]
Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey]
Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey]
How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey]
Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey]
If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey]
Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it [Rey]
Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism [Rey]
Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' [Rey]
Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well [Rey]
Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey]
Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli [Rey]
Children speak 90% good grammar [Rey]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey]
We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey]
CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey]
Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey]
If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' [Rey]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche]
There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche]
To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche]
The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche]
When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche]
In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche]
A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Our desires become important when we have desires about desires [Rey]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche]
Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche]