37 ideas
4697 | There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady] |
4731 | Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady] |
4735 | Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady] |
4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
4705 | Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady] |
4700 | A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady] |
4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
4711 | Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady] |
4698 | What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
4715 | We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
4720 | Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady] |
4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
4709 | Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady] |
4725 | Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady] |
4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
4710 | Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady] |
4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
4706 | Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady] |
4734 | Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady] |
6606 | Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
4727 | The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady] |