31 ideas
| 2676 | Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle] |
| 2675 | Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle] |
| 12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
| 12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
| 2677 | Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle] |
| 2674 | Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle] |
| 12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
| 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
| 16967 | 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle] |
| 12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
| 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
| 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
| 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
| 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
| 12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
| 16149 | Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle] |
| 11840 | Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle] |
| 12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
| 12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
| 12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
| 12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
| 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
| 12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
| 12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
| 12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
| 12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
| 12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
| 12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
| 12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |