Combining Texts

All the ideas for '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics', 'Understanding and Essence' and 'Psychophysical supervenience'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12596 Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
12599 Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
12595 We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12597 I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
12598 Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15456 Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
19262 Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19267 Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
19268 Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
12602 There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
12603 We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
12601 The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
19264 Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
12592 Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
12590 Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
12593 The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
12588 Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
12589 Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
12600 The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
12594 If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
12591 Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]