117 ideas
16512 | Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins] |
11283 | There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis] |
1672 | Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle] |
12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
1684 | Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle] |
12145 | Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle] |
12075 | An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12384 | Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle] |
9066 | You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle] |
12382 | What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle] |
1668 | An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle] |
12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
12376 | Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle] |
12373 | Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle] |
12363 | Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
13004 | Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
12377 | Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle] |
12372 | The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle] |
12369 | A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle] |
17529 | Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins] |
17530 | The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins] |
16523 | Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins] |
16524 | Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins] |
12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
16526 | Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins] |
18910 | To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle] |
1675 | Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle] |
1677 | We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle] |
16492 | Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins] |
16493 | Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins] |
16496 | Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins] |
16495 | The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins] |
16501 | In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins] |
16506 | Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins] |
1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle] |
1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle] |
12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
16509 | Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins] |
17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung] |
16514 | Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins] |
16510 | Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins] |
16503 | 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins] |
16499 | A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins] |
16515 | A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins] |
16517 | Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins] |
16498 | Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins] |
16497 | Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins] |
16502 | Identity is primitive [Wiggins] |
16521 | A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins] |
16505 | By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins] |
16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |
12381 | What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle] |
1690 | A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle] |
16522 | It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins] |
12072 | For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12073 | 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12378 | The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle] |
12364 | We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle] |
12370 | Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle] |
12366 | We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle] |
1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle] |
1673 | Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle] |
12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle] |
16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle] |
23309 | Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
1693 | Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle] |
9067 | Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle] |
1671 | Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle] |
1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle] |
16525 | Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins] |
1674 | All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle] |
24068 | Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
17310 | Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
21359 | Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle] |
1667 | Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle] |
12365 | We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle] |
10918 | Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle] |
12374 | Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle] |
12148 | Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle] |
1679 | Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle] |
1680 | Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle] |
1691 | Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle] |
12383 | There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle] |
12147 | The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle] |
12371 | A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle] |
1683 | We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle] |
12367 | What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle] |
12385 | Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle] |
12380 | Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle] |
1689 | Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle] |
1686 | What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle] |
12357 | Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
1669 | The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle] |
1678 | Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle] |
12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
9068 | Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle] |
9069 | A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle] |
16518 | We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins] |
16511 | A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins] |
12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
9070 | We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle] |
12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
12368 | Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle] |
12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle] |
12375 | Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle] |
1688 | Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle] |