Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'Truth-maker Realism: response to Gregory' and 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]