Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter' and 'Semantic Necessity'

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16 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell]
Matter is a logical construction [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell]