20 ideas
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |