31 ideas
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
| 10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
| 10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
| 10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
| 10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
| 10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
| 10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
| 10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
| 10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
| 6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
| 6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
| 6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
| 10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |