Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Induction', 'The Mysterious Flame' and 'The Question of Realism'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
2546 Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
2544 Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
15006 Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
15055 Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
15052 Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
15056 The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15061 Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
8800 If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
15059 Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
2539 Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
2545 Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
2543 Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
2540 Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2547 There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
15058 A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
2542 Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn]