Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'Aristotelian commentaries' and 'Actualism and Possible Worlds'

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10 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being

14664

Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

16751

Unity by aggregation, order, inherence, composition, and simplicity [Conimbricense, by Pasnau]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects

14666

Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

14662

Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism

16472

Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

16720

Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

8130	Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics

16469

Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]

16470

Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

14663

Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]