22 ideas
14273 | Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington] |
14281 | A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington] |
14284 | Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington] |
14270 | Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington] |
14269 | Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington] |
14275 | Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington] |
14274 | Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington] |
14276 | The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington] |
14290 | Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington] |
14271 | Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington] |
14272 | I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington] |
14282 | On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington] |
14278 | Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington] |
14287 | Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington] |
8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |