Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'Negation' and 'Critique of Judgement I: Aesthetic'

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30 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]
In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim]
Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton]
It is hard to see why we would have developed Kant's 'disinterested' aesthetic attitude [Cochrane on Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant]
When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant]
Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Kant thinks beauty ignores its objects, because it is only 'form' engaging with mind [Cochrane on Kant]
The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch]
Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C]
Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard]
The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton]
The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant]