Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'Structuralism Reconsidered' and 'The Nature of Mental States'

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11 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
8923 Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
8926 For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
8130 Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]