14 ideas
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
| 12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton] |
| 12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton] |
| 12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton] |
| 12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton] |
| 12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton] |