36 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |