Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Rationality', 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong' and 'The Emergence of Probability'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
7454 Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
6950 You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
6954 A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12619 We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
12620 If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
12613 Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
7447 Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking]
7448 Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking]
7449 Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
12617 Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
7450 In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
7451 Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
7452 An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
6955 Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
6952 Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
6953 All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
7459 Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
6951 Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
12615 Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6650 Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618 It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621 Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622 Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623 The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]