Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Thought', 'The Morality of Happiness' and 'The Nature of Necessity'

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40 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Inference is never a conscious process [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman]
Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman]
A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman]
Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Defining dispositions is circular [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]